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The Choice of Debt Source by UK Firms 
  
  
  
Abstract 
We examine the choice of borrowing source between public debt, syndicated bank loans, 
bilateral bank loans, and non-bank private debt. Using a sample of 400 non-financial firms over 
2000±2012, we find strong support for the reputational theory of borrowing source. Larger firms 
are more likely to borrow in public debt markets. Bank dependent firms are less likely to borrow 
in public debt markets and choose between bank and non-bank private debt based on maturity, 
collateral available to lenders, and other firm characteristics. These results are consistent with the 
role of borrower reputation being the primary determinant of borrowing source for UK listed 
firms. 
  
JEL Classification: G20, G21, G32 
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1.      INTRODUCTION 
7KHRUHWLFDO UHVHDUFK DVVLJQV DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH WR WKH GHEW VRXUFH LQ D ILUP¶V capital 
VWUXFWXUH GHFLVLRQ )LUVW 'LDPRQG¶V  UHSXWDWLRQDO WKHRU\ SURSRVHV WKDW ILUPV EXLOG
reputation in credit markets through borrowing and repaying private debt initially, and that 
repeating this process over time allows firms to build a reputation in credit markets. This results 
in lower borrowing costs. Second, bank monitoring can reduce asymmetric information costs for 
firms that produce less information than lenders in public debt markets optimally demand, as 
banks can more closely scrutinize the firm to monitor cash flows (Fama, 1985). Finally, bank 
debt is more easily renegotiated in the event of financial distress given that bank lenders have 
PRUH LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH ILUP¶V FDVK IORZV DQG LQYHVWPHQW RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR GHFLGH ZKHWKHU
liquidation is optimal (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Yosha, 1995).1  
In this paper we empirically investigate theories of debt source choice by examining their 
determinants in a UK setting. We use the distinctive features of the UK market for corporate 
lending to extend the literature on the choice of borrowing source. UK firms historically have 
placed a greater dependence on bank debt than public bond issues. Data from the Bank of 
England (2009, 2012) illustrates that UK firms continue to borrow predominately from banks 
and show a large increase in the use of syndicated bank loans, relative to bilateral loans, in recent 
years. Moreover, the underdeveloped nature of the public bond market in the UK creates a 
potentially important role for non-bank private debt as an DOWHUQDWLYH ERQG VRXUFH LQ D ILUP¶V
financing choice in the UK (Breedon, 2012). Diamond (1991) refers to the importance of non-
traditional debt sources for low credit quality firms screened out of bank lending and public bond 
markets. Given the description of non-bank private debt as combining the features of low-grade 
                                                 
1 Johnson (1997) and Denis and Mihov (2003) provide detailed reviews of the theoretical determinants of borrowing 
source.  
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public debt and bank debt in Denis and Mihov (2003), we expect that non-bank private debt can 
represent an important financing source for UK firms.  
Using a sample of UK non-financial firms in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) over the period 2000 to 2012 we consider the determinants of both the existing 
balance sheet debt and the source of finance for new debt issuance. In doing so, we distinguish 
between borrowing from public debt markets, bank loans (both bilateral and syndicated), and 
non-bank private debt. Focusing on existing and new debt issues allows us to consider the 
LPSRUWDQFH RI ILUP DQG GHEW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV FUHGLW PDUNHW FRQGLWLRQV DQG D ILUP¶V ILQDQFLQJ
history in determining incremental financing choices. 
Our study extends the literature on the choice of debt source in a number of areas. First, 
we consider a broader range of bank lending sources for both existing balance sheet debt and 
marginal debt financing choices than has been examined in the literature. Examining incremental 
financing decisions allows for an improved understanding of the role of firm, loan and economic 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG D ILUP¶V ERUURZLQJ KLVWRU\ LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH VRXUFH RI ERUURZLQJ than is 
SRVVLEOH ZKHQ H[DPLQLQJ SUHYLRXVO\ LVVXHG GHEW RQ WKH ILUP¶V EDODQFH VKHHW ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR
splitting debt financing between bonds and loans, we separate bonds between public and non-
bank private bonds and new bank loans between syndicated and bilateral lending agreements.  
Second, we use this expanded range of borrowing sources to examine the impact of 
ERUURZHUUHSXWDWLRQRQDILUP¶VFKRLFHRIGHEWVRXUFH7KHLQLWLDOHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKEXLOGLQJRQ
'LDPRQG¶V  DV\PPHWULF LQIRUPDWLRQ EDVHG PRGHl of borrower reputation proposes that 
firms borrow from public and private debt sources. This research has developed over time to 
consider the role of reputation in accessing non-bank private debt (Johnson, 1997; Denis and 
Mihov, 2003; Arena, 2011). However few studies distinguish between bilateral and syndicated 
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bank loans and none, to our knowledge, in the context of the choice across a range of debt 
sources.2 We argue that syndicated loans combine elements of traditional relationship lending 
associated with bilateral bank loans and transaction based lending more commonly associated 
with raising capital in bond markets. In this sense, syndicated loans can be viewed as an 
H[WHQVLRQRI'LDPRQG¶VUHSXWDWLRQDOWKHRU\RIERUURZLQJVRXUFHFKRLFH6\QGLFDted loans 
are more easily monitored than public bonds, but less so than bilateral lending agreements. 
Finally, we extend the literature by examining the impact of the global financial crisis on 
WKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIDILUP¶VERUURZLQJVRXUFH2XUVDPSOHFRYHrs the period of credit expansion 
prior to 2008 and the reported collapse in the availability of bank financing worldwide. Given the 
expected reduction in bank lending surrounding this period we examine whether the financial 
crisis had a direct impact on balance sheet debt source and the choice of marginal borrowing 
source. We also consider whether and how the determinants of borrowing source have changed 
around the financial crisis. 
When choosing amongst debt securities, we find that the largest debt issues are loans 
syndicated across a number of lending banks. However, our results also show that syndicated and 
bilateral loans have similar maturities. Public bonds and non-bank private debt have longer 
PDWXULWLHV:HILQGWKDW WKHPDWXULW\RID ILUP¶VH[LVWLQJGHEW LVFORVHO\ UHODWHG WR LWVPDUJLQDO
financing choices as firms with a higher proportion of existing long-term debt are more likely to 
borrow in bond markets in their incremental financing decisions.   
                                                 
2 See Houston and James (1996) and Hadlock and James (2002) for US evidence on the choice between public and 
private securities and Barnes and Cahill (2005) and Antoniou et al. (2008) for UK firms. A small number of studies 
have examined the choice of public bond financing relative to syndicated bank loans (Altunbas et al., 2009) and 
syndicated loans relative to bilateral loans (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Marsh, 2006; Sufi, 2007). Gomes and 
Phillips (2012) examine the choice between public and private markets, and amongst straight debt, equity, and 
convertible securities. However, their private category aggregates syndicated and bilateral loans with Rule 144-A 
privately placed bonds. None of these studies examine syndicated loans across a broad spectrum of debt choices. 
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&RQVLVWHQW ZLWK 'LDPRQG¶V  WKHRUHWLFDO SUHGLFWLRQV ZH ILQG WKDW ILUP VL]H DQG
collateral are the most important firm characteristics in determining debt source. Larger firms are 
more likely to borrow in public debt markets and firms with little collateral are screened out of 
traditional sources and forced to borrow in non-bank private markets. Our findings on the 
importance of fixed assets as collateral also support theories of debt source based on efficiency 
of liquidation where firms with difficult to value intangible assets are more likely to choose 
private debt sources. We find other firm characteristics affect existing debt source or incremental 
financing choices, but they are not consistent across our results.  
ReputatiRQHIIHFWVLQFUHGLWPDUNHWVDUHDOVRHYLGHQWLQWKHLPSDFWRIDILUP¶VERUURZLQJ
history on marginal financing choice. We find that firms that are characterized as bank 
dependent are significantly less likely to borrow in public debt markets relative to other 
financing sources. Prior to the global financial crisis we find that syndicated bank loans act as 
intermediate step to public debt markets for bank dependent firms, but this effect is not present in 
the post-crisis period where bilateral loans increased in popularity for our sample of large firms.  
We find that the financial crisis has impacted on the determinants of borrowing source. 
Firm age and industry specialization, which are associated with borrower reputation and the need 
for ease of renegotiation of lending agreements, are important determinants of borrowing source 
in the post-crisis period, but were unrelated to borrowing source pre-crisis. Moreover, within the 
crisis period non-bank private debt is more frequently issued when economic growth is weak, 
ZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKDWEDQNVZHUHUHOXFWDQWWROHQGDWWKLVSRLQWLQWLPH7KLVVXSSRUWV'LDPRQG¶V
(1991) description of non-traditional lending sources for firms that have been screened out of 
bank lending markets. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of 
the sample data. Our results for existing debt financing are in Section 3. Section 4 reports our 
findings for incremental debt financing decisions. Section 5 examines the impact of the financial 
crisis RQ ILUP¶V GHEW VRXUFLQJ GHFLVLRQV 6HFWLRQ  GLVFXVVHV IXUWKHU DQDO\VLV WR FRQILUP WKH
robustness of our core findings. Finally Section 7 provides a summary and concludes. 
  
2. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND VARIABLE DEFINTIONS 
(i)  Choice of Borrowing Source 
In WKLVVHFWLRQZHH[SODLQWKHFKRLFHRIERUURZLQJVRXUFHVWKDWZHFRQVLGHULQDILUP¶VPDUJLQDO
financing decision. Public debt is a bond security where firms typically agree to repay fixed 
coupon payments over the life of the bond and the par value at maturity. A commonality in 
theories of debt sourcing is that the bond is sold to a wide group of passive investors who are not 
expected to monitor the loan (Diamond, 1991). However, competition amongst a larger number 
of capital providers is expected to result in public debt markets offering lower cost debt 
financing than private debt markets, including bank lending. Given the unmonitored nature of 
public debt, firms borrowing in this market are expected to be amongst the largest and most 
reputable credit market participants (Houston and James, 1996; Gomes and Phillips, 2012). 
Non-bank private debt is privately placed debt where the issuing firm raises funds 
directly from private investors that are not identified as banks, such as insurance firms, pension 
funds, and other private investor groups. Non-bank private debt most commonly takes the form 
of a bond where the borrower pays a coupon at regular intervals and repays the par value of the 
bond at redemption, but unlike a public bond the debt is not registered on a public exchange. 
Kwan and Carleton (2010) state that public bonds and non-bank private debt differ in three main 
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ways: (i) the design of bond covenants, (ii) credit monitoring, and (iii) the relative ease of 
renegotiation. Denis and Mihov (2003) describe non-bank private debt as an intermediate 
instrument that combines elements of bank debt and low-grade public bonds.3  
Traditional theories of debt sourcing describe bank loans as a bilateral agreement between 
a lender and a borrower where interest and principal is repaid over the life of the loan. The single 
party nature of the agreement allows for closer monitoring and negotiating flexibility in the event 
of default. Diamond (1991) argues that firms seeking to build a relationship with a bank can 
borrow on bilateral terms. Firms will also choose to borrow from a single lender to maintain a 
comparative advantage when they are concerned about competitors acquiring proprietary 
information (Bushman et al., 2010).  
Syndicated loans involve two or more lending banks agreeing to provide funding to the 
borrowing firm and each member of a lending syndicate is a direct lender to the borrower. Each 
syndicate has a lead or managing agent who is responsible for arranging the loan, coordinating 
documentation, and administrating the loan repayment. In a syndicated loan it is typical for the 
borrowing firm to form a relation with the lead agent, who in turn forms a relation with other 
lenders in the syndicate (Ball et al., 2008). Monitoring and due diligence by the lead agent 
reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and members of the lending syndicate 
(Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2012). Drucker and Puri (2009) argue that syndicated 
lending agreements are typically for larger amounts than bilateral loans because they allow 
lenders to reduce their exposure to credit risk. Syndicated loans can also be structured with fewer 
and more concentrated lenders to increase monitoring efficiency and ease of renegotiation for 
high credit risk firms (Sufi, 2007). However, syndicated loans are expected to be subject to free 
                                                 
3 See Chandra and Nayar (2008) and Kwan and Carleton (2010) for a detailed discussion of privately placed debt. 
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rider and information asymmetry concerns relative to bilateral loans and therefore share elements 
of both public debt and bilateral loans (Boot, 2000; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000).  
These differences lead us to expect that firms borrowing from either bilateral or 
syndicated lending facilities display different firm or loan characteristics. Borrowing through 
syndicated loans allows for the benefits of lender monitoring by the lead agent in the syndicate, 
but allows lenders to diversify the risk of default and increase loan amounts to borrowing firms 
(Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Godlewski et al., 2012). Free-rider problems imply that 
monitoring by a dispersed syndicate is less effective than by a single bank lender, but more 
effective than monitoring by a widely dispersed group of public bondholders (Boot, 2000; Ball et 
al., 2008). Syndicated lending can also allow borrowing firms to diversify lending sources and 
avoid the hold-up problems of single lender loans (Rajan, 1992; Houston and James, 1996).  
  
(ii)  Sample Construction 
We construct our sample by including all firms listed in the FTSE-350 index of the LSE during 
the period 2000 to 2012. Firms are included in our sample only for those years where they are 
listed in the FTSE-350. The large size of these firms allows them access to a wider variety of 
financing sources than for small and medium sized enterprises, for which economies of scale in 
information production and fixed issuance costs act as barriers to entry to public bond markets. 
Focusing on large firms allows us to consider factors beyond information production that 
GHWHUPLQHDILUP¶VRSWLPDOGHEWVRXUFH4 Excluding financial and utility firms produces an initial 
sample of 2,836 firm±year observations across 400 firms for which we collect data on existing 
debt ownership and borrowing source for debt issuance.  
                                                 
4 Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Hadlock and James (2002) provide detailed analyses of information asymmetry 
problems and debt sourcing decisions.  
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For each of the 400 firms in our sample, we manually collect data on outstanding debt 
from public, bank, and non-bank private lenders from tKH IRRWQRWHV WR HDFK ILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO
statements for each reporting year from 2000 to 2012. Firms classify existing debt by loan type 
and maturity, but not explicitly by lender source. This allows us to distinguish between 
previously issued public and privately held debt. However, in many cases we are unable to 
distinguish between non-bank private and bank debt, nor between syndicated and bilateral bank 
loans. Following Johnson (1997) we classify all private debt as non-bank private debt unless it is 
explicitly defined as bank debt in the notes.5 We find that ninety percent of firm-year 
observations have some outstanding debt on their balance sheet, providing a sample of 2,563 
firm±year observations across 399 of the 400 sample firms. This is the starting sample we use to 
examine the determinants of existing debt source in Section 3 of this paper.  
To capture the incremental choice of debt source for our sample firms, we use Nexis UK 
to manually search for announcements of issuances of public debt, bilateral and syndicated bank 
debt and non-bank private debt.6 Announcements of private debt issuance are classified as bank 
debt only where banks are explicitly mentioned as the lending institution. We relate the source of 
ERUURZLQJIRUDILUP¶VPDUJLQDOILQDQFLQJchoice over the subsequent financial year, time t+1, to 
firm characteristics and borrowing history at time t. Therefore our sample period for incremental 
borrowing decisions is from 2001 to 2013. We use this sample to analyze the determinants of 
incremental borrowing decisions in Section 4 of this paper.  
                                                 
5 One problem with this approach is that it can understate the use of bank debt. However, as 81% of sample private 
debt announcements are classed as bank debt is appears that this categorisation picks up a significant volume of 
bank debt. 
6 )ROORZLQJ+DGORFNDQG-DPHVZHVHDUFKIRUDUWLFOHVRQGHEWLVVXHVXVLQJWKHIROORZLQJNH\ZRUGV³OLQHRI
FUHGLW´³ORDQDJUHHPHQW´³EDQNORDQ´³FUHGLWDJUHHPHQW´³FUHGLWOLQH´³FUHGLWIDFLOLW\´³FUHGLWH[WHQVLRQ´³QHZ
ORDQ´ ³ORDQ UHQHZDO´ ³ORDQ UHYLVLRQ´ ³ORDQ H[WHQVLRQ´ ³WHUP ORDQ´ ³ GHEW LVVXH´ ³GHEW RIIHU´ ³SXEOLF GHEW
LVVXH´DQG³SXEOLFGHEWRIIHU´7RDXJPHQWWKHVDPSOHWKHIROORZLQJNH\ZRUGVDUHDOVRHPSOR\HG³ERQG´³ERQG
LVVXH´³GHEWQRWHV´³ORDQIDFLOLW\´³ZRUNLQJFDSLWDOIDFLOLW\´³SULYDWHSODFHPHQW´DQG³RYHUGUDIW´ 
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We initially identify bank loans, both syndicated and bilateral, through stock exchange 
announcements and news reports from Nexis UK. Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) find that 
approximately 25% of US bank loans are announced in the media, which raises concerns of 
selection bias if studies rely exclusively on news reports to collect data on debt source. 
Therefore, we supplement our sample of news reported bank loan announcements with loan data 
for our sample firms reported by DealScan. We find an initial sample of 810 announced bank 
loans in Nexis UK, which comprises over 97% of the loans for sample firms contained in 
DealScan. We add 24 unannounced bank loans from DealScan providing a final sample of 834 
loans.7 Of these, 667 loans are syndicated and the remaining 167 are bilateral lending 
agreements. 
We follow this approach to collect announcements of non-bank private debt issuance. 
Nexis UK provides an initial sample of 194 announced non-bank private loans, which we cross-
reference against the Private Placement Letter database for each of our sample firms. We find 
that our sample of non-bank private loan announcements comprise 98% of the loans available in 
Private Placement Letter, and add 4 unannounced non-bank private loans to our sample, 
producing a final sample of 198 loans.   
We collect data on public debt issuance from Nexis UK, Thomson ONE and Datastream. 
We find an initial sample of 333 announced public bonds in Nexis UK. We then cross-reference 
our sample of announced public bonds with those from Thomson ONE and DataStream and find 
no additional announcements of public debt issuance through these sources. Therefore, across all 
borrowing sources we have a sample of 1,365 marginal financing announcements. 
  
(iii) Variable Definitions 
                                                 
7 Our initial Nexis UK sample contained only one loan that was not included on the DealScan database. 
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Johnson (1997) classifies theoretical research on the determinants of debt source across three 
broad categories: models based on monitoring and information costs, models based on efficiency 
RIOLTXLGDWLRQDQGPRGHOVEDVHGRQERUURZHUV¶UHSXWDWLRQDQGLQFHQWLYHVWRUHSD\(PSLrically, 
the distinction between these areas is frequently blurred as variables can proxy for several 
theoretical concepts. In this section we discuss the empirical variables used in our study. 
In Section 3 we relate firm characteristics to the proportion of existing balance sheet debt 
outstanding from each borrowing source described above. In each case the dependent variable is 
the amount of debt outstanding from an individual borrowing source divided by total debt 
outstanding on the balance sheet. The independent variables are measured contemporaneously to 
the dependent variables.  
In Section 4 we relate binary dependent variables of the source of borrowing for 
incremental security issuance decisions to firm and loan characteristics, economic and credit 
maUNHWFRQGLWLRQVDQGDILUP¶VERUURZLQJKLVWRU\DW WKHWLPHRILVVXDQFH)LUPFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
borrowing history, economic conditions and firm performance are measured in the period prior 
to the new loan announcement. Loan characteristics and credit market spreads are taken from the 
loan announcement itself. 
  
(a) Determinants of Existing Debt Source 
Firm size. Prior literature is unanimous in finding that firms borrowing in public debt markets are 
larger than those that borrow from private sources (Hadlock and James, 2002). This is supportive 
of information production and borrower reputation theories of debt source, where larger firms 
naturally produce the information required to borrow in public markets and their size is 
correlated with reputation in credit markets. For private borrowing Denis and Mihov (2003) find 
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no difference in firm size between bank and non-bank private debt issues. We measure Firm size 
as the book value of total assets (£millions) indexed to 2000 sterling figures using the UK 
consumer price inflation index.  
Firm age. Older firms are expected to have built a reputation in credit markets that allows 
them to access more competitive public bond markets with lower yields (Diamond, 1991). 
Consistent with this, Krishnaswami et al. (1999) and Hadlock and James (2002) find a positive 
relation between firm age and the use of public debt. Johnson (1997) also finds a positive 
relation between firm age and the proportion of total debt from public bonds, but a negative 
relation between age and the proportion of bank debt, and no relation between age and non-bank 
private debt. We use Firm age as a measure of reputation in credit markets, where age is 
measured from the date of incorporation.  
Fixed assets ratio. Offering tangible assets as collateral is viewed as a sign of a lower risk 
borrower (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Johnson (1997) finds that the proportion of both bank debt 
and public debt outstanding increases with the fixed assets ratio. The proportion of non-bank 
private debt outstanding is negatively related to this ratio. Denis and Mihov (2003) find that 
firms are more likely to issue public debt if they have a higher proportion of fixed assets, but find 
no distinction between bank and non-bank private debt. The Fixed assets ratio is defined as the 
ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets. 
Specialized industry. Firms with specialized assets and who provide ongoing after-sales 
service for their products, such as maintenance and warranties, are expected to suffer to a greater 
extent from indirect costs of bankruptcy and therefore prefer easier to renegotiate private debt. 
Applying this to debt sourcing decisions, Johnson (1997) finds that firms operating in specialized 
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industries have a lower proportion of public debt outstanding.8 We use a dummy variable for 
firms operating in Specialized industries that takes the value of one for firms in the durable 
goods industry with SIC codes between 3400 and 3999, and zero otherwise.  
Investment opportunities. Empirical evidence on the impact of growth opportunities on 
the choice of debt source is mixed. Krishnaswami et al. (1999) report a positive relation between 
DILUP¶VIXWXUHJURZWKRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGWKHXVHRISULYDWHGHEWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKILUPVZLWKKLJKHr 
growth opportunities finding it beneficial to use a banking relationship. However Hadlock and 
James (2002) and Denis and Mihov (2003) find no evidence of a relation between growth 
opportunities and the choice of debt source. We measure Investment as the sum of capital 
expenditures and research and development spending divided by total assets.  
Earnings volatility. *UHDWHUHDUQLQJVYRODWLOLW\LPSOLHVOHVVFHUWDLQW\LQDILUP¶VDELOLW\WR
meet future interest obligations and creates a preference for private debt that can be renegotiated 
to preserve asset value. Johnson (1997) finds a negative relation between public debt and 
earnings growth volatility. Similarly Houston and James (1996) find that greater stock price 
volatility reduces the likelihood of firms borrowing in public debt markets. Following Clubb and 
Wu (2014), Earnings volatility is defined as the standard deviation of pretax income minus 
income taxes for the previous three years divided by the average total assets for the period.9  
Firm performance. Diamond (1991) argues that less profitable firms typically have 
weaker credit market reputations and are more likely to take on riskier projects. This leads to 
unprofitable firms being unable to access public bond markets. Denis and Mihov (2003) find that 
both bank and non-bank private borrowers are less profitable than firms that have public debt 
outstanding. Hadlock and James (2002) find that firms issuing bank debt have significantly lower 
                                                 
8 Specialised industries are defined as firms in the machinery, computing, and technology sectors. 
9 The results presented in our paper are robust to the alternative cash flow volatility measure presented in Clubb and 
Wu (2014) and the earnings volatility measure used in Johnson (1997). 
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stock price returns than public debt issuers in the 12 months prior to borrowing. We measure 
firm performance as Return on assets, which we define as the ratio of earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortization to total assets.  
Leverage. Johnson (1998) argues that the use of private debt increases with firm leverage. 
This arises where bank debt can mitigate both information asymmetry and the problem of asset 
substitution, increasing the willingness of banks to lend to familiar firms. Borrowers with a high 
risk of default choose a private lender who has a reputation for making efficient liquidation 
decisions. However, Diamond (1993) argues that the heightened chance of liquidation and 
frequent renegotiation brought on by private borrowing can encourage the use of unmonitored 
public debt by firms that are highly leveraged. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) show that firms 
should have less debt in their capital structure if they can only raise debt from private sources or 
if they are limited in the amount of debt they can issue in public markets. Denis and Mihov 
(2003) find that firms issuing public debt have higher leverage than firms issuing bank and non-
bank private debt. Johnson (1997) finds that the proportions of public debt and bank debt 
increase with leverage, but non-bank private debt is found to be negatively related to leverage. 
We measure Leverage as the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
  
(b) Additional At-Issue Determinants of the Incremental Debt Financing Source 
Existing debt source. To the extent that firm characteristics, such as size, asset type, and credit 
market reputation change slowly over time, firms are expected to borrow from existing 
providers. Consistent with this, Hadlock and James (2002) and Denis and Mihov (2003) find that 
firms with outstanding public debt are more likely to raise new loans in this market and bank 
dependent firms are more likely to raise new loans from banks. Denis and Mihov (2003) find no 
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clear link from existing debt finance to the use of new non-bank private loans, suggesting that 
non-bank private loans represent deviations from regular financing patterns. We use two key 
variables to examine existing debt source. Proportion long-term debt is the fraction of existing 
GHEWRQWKHILUP¶VEDODQFHVKHHWZLWh a maturity of greater than one year. Following Hadlock and 
James (2002) we define Bank dependent as a dummy variable that takes the value one when the 
proportion of outstanding bank debt is greater than the median proportion of outstanding bank 
debt (0.71) for all sample firms and the firm has no public debt outstanding, and zero otherwise. 
In further unreported analysis we also include a binary variable, Public debt outstanding, which 
takes the value one if the firm has any public debt outstanding on its financial statements, and 
zero otherwise.  
Credit quality. We use financial distress as an indirect measure of borrowing firm credit 
quality. Carey et al. (1998) find that loans to riskier investment projects tend to be made by non-
bank private lenders. Denis and Mihov (2003) observe that high credit quality firms borrow from 
public sources, firms with moderate credit quality borrow from banks, and that for low credit 
quality firms non-bank private debt meets their debt financing requirements. Following 
Hovakimian and Titman (2004), Credit quality is based on low interest coverage and is a dummy 
variable set to one where the interest coverage ratio is less than 0.8, or less than 1 in two 
consecutive years. Interest coverage is calculated as EBITDA divided by total interest payable.10  
Loan size. Firms issuing public debt tend to be larger firms issuing larger amounts that 
suffer less from information asymmetry, and consequently require less monitoring (Denis and 
Mihov, 2003). In contrast, issues of private debt, particularly bank debt, are most attractive for 
firms issuing smaller amounts. Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) find that, on average, private debt 
                                                 
10 Our results are robust to using the Taffler Z-score measure for UK firms (see Agarwal and Taffler, 2008) 
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issues are half the size of public issues.11 For private debt Denis and Mihov (2003) find that non-
bank private loans are generally smaller than bank loans. The growth of the syndicated loans 
market has altered this traditional concept; firms wishing to borrow large amounts of debt can 
now raise the debt from a group of banks or other financial institutions (Dennis and Mullineaux, 
2000). We define Loan size as the value of the loan issued indexed for consumer price inflation 
to the year 2000.  
Loan maturity. Much of the literature on loan maturity complements the literature on the 
determinants of debt sourcing. For example, borrowing at shorter maturities is associated with 
ease of renegotiation in the event of financial distress and ease of monitoring managerial 
decision making at the point where loans are rolled over (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Dang, 2011). 
As such, public issues of debt have longer maturities than non-bank private loans and bank loans 
(James, 1987; Johnson, 1997). Loan maturity is measured as the number of years to maturity for 
each loan.  
Economic performance and credit market conditions. Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) and 
Cantillo and Wright (2000) find an important role for credit market conditions in debt source. 
Therefore we include three measures of economic performance and prevailing credit market 
conditions that could impact the choice of debt source. We use lagged quarterly GDP to examine 
whether prevailing economic conditions impact on debt source. ¨GDP is the change in gross 
domestic product over the quarter before the debt announcement is made. We include Libor and 
the term structure of interest rates to determine whether firms are more likely to borrow from 
longer term public sources or shorter term private sources dependent on current and expected 
future interest rates. Libor is the United Kingdom Interbank 3-month offer rate on the date that 
                                                 
11 It would be expected that lenders of larger amounts are more likely to carry out more thorough pre-loan diligence 
than lenders of smaller loans.  
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the announcement is made. Term spread is the spread between 10-year UK Government bonds 
and 3-month T-bills, again measured on the date that the loan announcement is made.   
  
3. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING DEBT MIX 
(i) Summary Statistics on Existing Debt Mix 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of 2,563 firm±year observations. The data 
are complete for debt source data collected from the financial statements, but we lose some 
observations when matching to Worldscope for accounting and economic data. The mean 
(median) leverage ratio is 0.30 (0.23). This figure is higher than previously reported for UK 
firms by Rajan and Zingales (1995), reflecting the larger size of firms in our sample. 42%, 43%, 
and 95% of firm±year observations have some public, non-bank private, or bank debt 
outstanding respectively. The figure of 43% non-bank private debt outstanding is almost 
identical to the figures in Breedon (2012), which lends support to our classification of private 
debt as non-bank unless it is explicitly identified as bank debt in the financial statements. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The importance of bank debt for our sample of UK firms is reinforced when we consider 
the relative importance of debt source to total debt. The mean (median) bank debt to total debt 
ratio is 0.60 (0.71). Public debt is 24% of total debt on average and non-bank private debt is 15% 
of total debt. The median firm has no public debt or non-bank private debt outstanding. Public 
and non-bank private debt becomes slightly more important when we focus on long-term debt, 
but even here bank debt remains the dominant source of debt.  
Our summary statistics emphasize the limited use of the public bond market in the UK 
relative to the US and we expect syndicated bank loans to provide an important alternative debt 
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source for our sample firms. Comparison with earlier UK studies of bank debt is difficult given 
inconsistency in classification of bank and non-bank private debt, but our total private debt 
figure of 75% is lower than in Antoniou et al. (2008), who find that private debt comprises 95% 
of total debt in their UK sample; this difference is most likely due to the size of firms in the 
respective samples.  
  
(ii) Determinants of Existing Debt Sourcing Mix 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for borrowing firms based on their main source of debt 
finance. We report this data for the sub-sample of 2,248 firm±years where we have complete 
data across all dependent and explanatory variables used in subsequent regression analysis of the 
determinants of existing debt source. The main source of debt is defined as the source that 
represents the highest proportion of debt ownership amongst public debt, bank debt, and non-
bank private debt. Firm years are allocated to sub groups according to the largest proportion of 
WKHLUUHSRUWHGGHEWLQWKDW\HDU³PRVWO\SXEOLF´³PRVWO\EDQN´DQG³PRVWO\QRQ-EDQNSULYDWH´
We use superscripts 1, 2, and 3 to denote that firm characteristics for firms borrowing 
predominantly from one debt source are significantly different at the 5% level or greater from 
those borrowing predominantly from other sources in the corresponding numbered columns.12 
Firms with predominately public debt outstanding are older and larger than firms that 
have mostly bank debt outstanding. The average firm that relies mainly on public debt has been 
incorporated for 49.88 years and has total assets of £6,973 million, compared to 39.18 years and, 
£1,336 million for firms that use mostly bank debt. Non-bank private borrowers are older and 
                                                 
12 For example, the mean asset value of £1,336 million for firms borrowing predominantly from banks is highlighted 
with the superscripts 1 and 3. This denotes that the mean value is significantly different at the 5% level from both 
the reported mean assets of £6,973 million in column 1 for firms predominantly borrowing from public debt markets 
and from the mean assets of £4,823 million in column 3 for firms predominantly borrowing from non-bank private 
debt sources.  
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larger than firms primarily borrowing from banks, but are smaller at the median level than firms 
that mainly use public debt. Firms that rely mainly on public debt have higher fixed assets ratios 
than firms that use primarily bank debt, who in turn have more tangible assets than firms relying 
mainly on non-bank private debt. These firms, with low levels of collateral to secure against their 
debt, may have been screened out of borrowing in public debt markets (Diamond, 1991).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 Sample firms that depend on primarily public debt also have higher leverage than those 
that rely mainly on non-bank private debt or bank debt. We find that firms operating in 
specialized industries have a lower proportion of public debt outstanding than bank debt. We 
find some evidence that firms that are more reliant on bank debt have better investment 
opportunities. These firms can benefit from the continuing nature, and flexibility, of a banking 
relationship (Boot, 2000). Firms that borrow mostly from banks outperform firms relying on 
public or non-bank private debt as their main source of debt financing. We find no evidence that 
firms are more likely to use a particular debt source based on their earnings volatility. 
In advance of our multivariate analysis we examine correlations amongst explanatory 
variables to investigate concerns surrounding multicolinearity. Table 3 provides information on 
the correlations between our explanatory variables. As expected, we find a positive correlation 
between firm size, firm age and asset tangibility, which highlights that older firms are larger and 
tend to have fewer intangible assets than younger and smaller firms. The table also highlights a 
negative relation between measures of investment intensity and risk, and asset tangibility. The 
highest reported correlation is 0.3269 (between Fixed assets ratio and Investment). We also 
estimate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for our explanatory variables and find that no 
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individual VIF is above 1.23. Collectively, these findings suggest that multicollinearity does not 
severely affect our regressions analysis in this section. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We extend our univariate analysis to estimate Tobit regressions of debt source 
determinants in Table 4 where the dependent variable is censored between zero and one. Tobit 
models are frequently used in the debt sourcing literature (Houston and James, 1996; Johnson, 
1997) and are appropriate here given that the median firm has no public or non-bank private debt 
outstanding. However, endogeneity concerns surrounding the joint determination of leverage and 
borrowing source mean that a basic Tobit model is not appropriate for our empirical testing. 
Johnson (1997) notes that leverage is empirically related to many of the same firm size, risk, and 
investment opportunity characteristics that are expected to be correlated with debt source, 
suggesting that they are jointly determined in practice.  
We use the ratio of cash to total assets as our instrumental variable in first stage 
regressions of the determinants of leverage. We suggest that cash to total assets is a valid 
instrument for debt source both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, the pecking order 
theory (Myers, 1984) predicts a negative relation between cash holdings and leverage. Firms 
accumulate cash over time and pay back debt as it becomes due. This allows firms to avoid 
future equity issues, which are expensive due to adverse selection costs. Opler et al. (1999) find 
that cash holdings are negatively related to leverage. Empirically, we find that cash to total assets 
is negatively correlated with firm leverage but is uncorrelated with the proportion of existing 
debt borrowed from any of the sources we examine in this study, and the choice of debt source in 
marginal financing decisions. Given this, we use cash to total assets as an instrument in our first 
stage leverage regressions.  
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Following our first-stage prediction of leverage, we specify a second-stage Tobit model 
where the dependent variable Debt source is defined as the ratio of debt from any individual 
source divided by total debt outstanding. We also report results separately for total debt and for 
long-term debt with a maturity greater than one year given the correlation between debt source 
and maturity noted by Johnson (1998) amongst others. All firm characteristics are as defined 
previously in Section 2 (iii). The regressions include year dummies, but we do not report these 
for brevity. We report p-values for standard errors clustered by firm and partial F-statistics for 
the first-stage regression of leverage ratios.13 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Models 1 and 4 of Table 4 present results where the proportion of public debt is the 
dependent variable. We find that public debt use is significantly positively related to firm size 
and earnings volatility. We also find weak evidence in model 4 that long-term public debt use 
increases with firm age. The results for firm size and age are consistent with the predictions of 
theories of debt source based on information asymmetry and borrower reputation (Diamond, 
1984, 1991; Fama, 1985). However, our findings for earnings volatility are inconsistent with the 
liquidation efficiency hypothesis where risk should be negatively correlated with public debt 
given the difficulty in renegotiating across dispersed public bondholders. This finding is 
consistent with Barnes and Cahill (2005) for their UK sample. We find no relation between 
leverage and public debt use, which is inconsistent with Johnson (1997). 
By construction, any debt that is not publicly traded is private. As such, we can reverse 
our results for public debt to interpret the relation between firm characteristics and private debt, 
i.e., the proportion of debt from private sources is negatively related to firm size. We expand on 
                                                 
13 Our results are robust to re-estimating these tests using instrumental variable two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions, rather than Tobit specifications.  
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this and separate private debt between borrowings from bank and non-bank private sources in 
regression models 2-3 and 5-6 of Table 4. We find that bank debt decreases with firm size 
(models 2 and 5), but non-bank private debt increases with size (models 3 and 6). This supports 
the arguments of Carey et al. (1993), who suggest that non-bank private debt fills a gap between 
public bond markets and bank debt. Earnings volatility is negatively related to the proportion of 
bank debt outstanding. Either banks are reluctant to provide finance to risky borrowers or risky 
firms are reluctant to borrow from banks who act as active monitors of their risky investment 
projects and cash flows. We find evidence of bank debt increasing with leverage and weak 
evidence that long-term non-bank private debt decreases with leverage. Our findings for bank 
debt are consistent with Johnson (1997) who argues that highly leveraged firms can benefit from 
monitoring by bank lenders. 
Our analysis of the determinants of existing debt sources provides general support for the 
reputational theory of Diamond (1991). Larger firms are expected to have built stronger 
reputations in credit markets, which allows for easier access to public bond markets.  We find 
little consistent support for theories of debt source choice based on efficiency of liquidation 
surrounding fixed and specialized assets as measures of loan collateral and indirect costs of 
bankruptcy.  
  
4. ANALYSIS OF INCREMENTAL FINANCING DECISIONS 
(i) Incremental Financing Choice Announcements 
In this section we extend our analysis to consider the determinants of incremental debt financing 
decisions for the sub-sample of firm±years when sample firms issue new loans or renew existing 
loan agreements. This allows us to consider issuing firm and loan characteristics such as credit 
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quality, borrowing history, and loan size at the point where firms make debt source decisions. 
Focusing on incremental financing decisions also allows us to separate bank loans into 
syndicated and bilateral loans.  
Table 5 summarizes loan announcements for our sample firms between 2001 and 2013.14 
In addition to the public, bank, and non-bank private debt classification for existing loans we 
separate new bank loans into bilateral single lender loans and loans syndicated across a number 
of lending banks.  
Panel A presents our initial sample of 1,365 loans over time and across debt sources. 
Consistent with our findings for existing debt, bank loans are the most frequent source of new 
debt finance announcements for our sample of UK firms. However, syndicated debt is the 
dominant method of raising debt capital from banks; 80% of all bank loans for our sample firms 
are made through a lending syndicate, which is notably higher than the 65% in Marsh (2006) for 
a sample of US bank loans. We attribute this to the lesser role of publicly traded bonds as a 
source of finance for UK firms and syndicated bank loans providing an alternative financing 
source. For example, using a similar sample construction, Hadlock and James (2002) find that 
public bonds are issued more frequently than bank loans for their sample of US firms.  
There is an increase in the use of bank debt, both syndicated and bilateral, in the lead up 
to the global financial crisis. Bank and public debt issuance experience a noticeable decline in 
frequency in 2008 and 2009 surrounding the crisis. Bank debt recovers following the crisis, but 
public debt issuance remains infrequent in the post-crisis period. Non-bank private debt issuance 
does not experience a strong change in frequency of issuance surrounding the crisis, which is 
consistent with the notion that non-bank debt is used for non-conventional purposes and 
therefore is not expected to follow general market financing trends. 
                                                 
14 Loans are made at time t+1 relative to the year the firm is in the FTSE-350 index. 
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We combine multiple loans of the same debt type within a single financial year, which 
reduces the initial sample of 1,365 loans to 1,002 firm±year debt issue observations. To examine 
the factors impacting the discrete debt source choice we then exclude firm±years where firms 
borrow from more than one source during a financial year. This removes confounding debt 
announcements and therefore we can examine the factors impacting the discrete debt source 
choice for each source of debt exclusively. This reduces the sample size to 794 firm±year 
observations. In our empirical testing this sample falls to 629 firm±years after matching to loan 
characteristics, accounting and credit market data. This sample comprises 130 public debt issues, 
353 syndicated bank loans, 82 bilateral bank loans, and 64 non-bank private loans. We report the 
distribution of these loans over time in Panel B of Table 5. In years where firms have multiple 
loans from a single source we include these in our sample and take the loan characteristics from 
the first announcement during the financial year. The final sample reported in Panel B of Table 5 
displays a similar time series pattern to the data in Panel A. We find a higher attrition rate for 
bonds and non-bank private debt relative to bank loans due to a small number of frequent bond 
market issuers.15   
 
(ii) Univariate Analysis of the Choice of Incremental Debt Source 
The summary statistics for debt issuance in Table 5 highlight that the majority of our bank loans 
are syndicated and not the single lender bilateral type loans often implicit in theoretical models 
of bank monitoring. As such, we develop our empirical analysis of marginal financing choice by 
focusing on the choice between public debt, bilateral bank loans, syndicated bank loans, and 
non-bank private debt. This extends the earlier work of Denis and Mihov (2003) and allows us to 
                                                 
15 We examine the robustness of our findings to this filter in Section 6.  
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directly test the theoretical arguments of Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Sufi (2007) that 
syndicated loans are intermediate between bilateral bank loans and publicly traded debt. For 
example, the monitoring (Diamond, 1991) or renegotiating (Preece and Mullineaux, 1996) of a 
syndicated loan is more straightforward than for an equivalent publicly traded bond with widely 
dispersed lenders, but more difficult than for a single lender bilateral loan. We present univariate 
comparisons of firm and loan characteristics across debt sources in Table 6 for the sample of 629 
loans where we are able to match to loan characteristics, accounting and credit market data.  
Consistent with our previous findings and reputation arguments we find that public debt 
issuers are larger than other debt issuers. Bank borrowers are smaller than public issuers, 
irrespective of whether these are syndicated or bilateral loans. Issuers of bilateral loans are 
smaller than issuers of non-bank private debt. Based on fixed assets ratios, public debt issuers 
offer greater collateral, followed by bank borrowers, while non-bank private borrowers offer the 
lowest potential collateral on loans. This result supports theories of debt source based on ease of 
renegotiation where borrowers with little collateral opt for debt sources that can be easily 
restructured in the event of financial distress. Our results in Table 6 do not support the 
asymmetric information theory of bank debt of Hadlock and James (2002) or the credit rating 
explanation of Denis and Mihov (2003). We find no evidence of a relation between debt source 
and either firm performance or interest coverage. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
When focusing on loan characteristics we find some significant differences between 
bilateral and syndicated bank loans indicating the importance of examining the two types of bank 
loan independently. Syndicated loans are larger than all other debt issues for our sample firms 
but there is no significant difference in loan size between public debt and bilateral bank loans. 
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Non-bank private debt issues are the smallest by a considerable margin. This result emphasizes 
the importance of syndicated loans for our sample firms. Syndicated borrowers are smaller than 
public debt issuers but they use the syndicated loan market to raise the largest amounts of 
finance. Our finding for loan size is not easily supported by the reputation or ease of 
renegotiation theories of Diamond (1991) and Preece and Mullineaux (1996). These theories do 
not explicitly refer to loan size, but they offer no clear explanation why bilateral bank loans and 
publicly traded bonds raise similar amounts of capital but syndicated loans raise the largest 
amounts of finance. Consistent with prior US studies, public debt has the longest maturity of all 
debt sources. The average loan has a maturity of 12.10 years, which is three times the 4-year 
maturity of the average syndicated or bilateral bank loan. Non-bank private debt is typically 
issued at maturities between these two other sources. These findings are consistent with Denis 
and Mihov (2003) for public and non-bank private debt and Preece and Mullineaux (1996), who 
find that syndicated and bilateral loans have similar maturities. 
Examining the link between debt source and economic and credit market conditions, we 
find that bilateral loans are issued more frequently during periods of weak economic growth. 
This is also apparent in Table 5, which highlights an increase in the use of bilateral loans from 
2011. Although inconsistent with anecdotal evidence and financial press coverage surrounding 
the financial crisis, this could indicate that for our sample of the largest UK firms the 
relationships they have with their main bank lenders become important in weak economic 
conditions. Public debt issuance is more common when the interbank cost of funding is higher 
and the spread between longer dated and shorter maturity debt is lower, suggesting that firms 
choose shorter-term bank debt when it has a lower cost relative to public markets, and vice versa. 
A similar pattern is observed within bank loan choices; bilateral loans are favored over 
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syndicated loans when Libor is lower and term spreads are higher, confirming the proposition 
that syndicated loans can act as an intermediate borrowing source between public and private 
debt markets. Non-bank private debt is issued during similar credit market conditions to 
syndicated loans. 
Our sample firms also exhibit a pattern of repeat borrowing. Table 6 shows that firms 
issuing in public debt markets have a higher proportion of existing debt with maturity greater 
than one year, suggesting they optimally choose longer-term public debt to match their preferred 
maturity structure. Similarly, firms that are already bank dependent are more likely to continue to 
borrow from banks rather than from public or non-bank private sources. Only 7% of public debt 
issuers are classified as bank dependent; 45% of firms borrowing on a bilateral basis are 
classified as bank dependent, compared to 38% of syndicated borrowers. A similar pattern is 
observed when focusing on firms that already have public debt outstanding. These findings 
support reputational theories of debt source and extend the prior empirical work to consider 
differences between bilateral and syndicated loans. These results again suggest that syndicated 
loans can act as an intermediate financing step between a single lender bank loan and publicly 
WUDGHGERQGVEDVHGRQDILUP¶VSULRUERUURZLQJKLVWRU\ 
In Table 7 we further explore the link between incremental debt issuance decisions and 
the presence of existing public or non-EDQNSULYDWHGHEWRQWKHILUP¶VEDODQFHVKHHW)ROORZLQJ
Denis and Mihov (2003) we categorize firms into five groups: (i) issuers with both public and 
non-bank private debt outstanding, (ii) issuers with public debt outstanding, but no non-bank 
private debt outstanding, (iii) issuers with non-bank private debt outstanding, but no public debt 
outstanding, (iv) issuers with neither public nor non-bank private debt outstanding, and (v) 
issuers with no outstanding debt. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Consistent with the reputation arguments of Diamond (1991), bank debt is the main debt 
source for firms with no debt outstanding or no public debt outstanding. Of the 156 issuing firms 
with no public or non-bank private debt outstanding, 136 (87%) use bank loans as their marginal 
debt source. The majority of these involve a syndicated loan. However, amongst firms with 
public debt outstanding, our sample firms remain more likely to use syndicated bank debt than 
any other debt source. This is inconsistent with Denis and Mihov (2003) who find that firms with 
public debt outstanding are more likely to use public debt than any other source in their 
incremental financing choice.  
This descriptive analysis provides further support for our univariate statistics in Table 6, 
which suggest an important role for syndicated bank loans for firms that could otherwise be 
expected to borrow in public debt markets. These results are consistent with Altunbas et al. 
(2009) who state that bonds and syndicated loans are used simultaneously by the largest 
European firms. The findings of Table 7 also suggest no obvious pattern to non-bank private debt 
based on prior debt sourcing decisions. This confirms that non-bank private debt is a distinct 
source of debt financing, and is consistent with the smaller amounts of finance raised under non-
bank private loans in Table 6. 
 
(iii) Nested Logit Models for the Joint Decision of Security Type and Lender Choice 
Huang and Ritter (2009) and Gomes and Phillips (2012) note that firms endogenously 
choose both the security to be issued and the market to issue. Analyzing debt financing within 
the structure of a nested logit model assumes that independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
holds only within individual nests. We follow the structure of Gomes and Phillips (2012) in 
29 
 
examining the choice between debt financing sources across security type and the choice of 
lending market. We propose two alternative VWUXFWXUHV IRU WKH QHVWHG ORJLW PRGHO RI D ILUP¶V
borrowing source decision. In the first we examine the choice of lender conditional on the 
security type chosen and in the second case we examine the choice of security conditional on the 
choice of lender. In both cases the nested logit is estimated with standard errors clustered by 
issuing firm. All firm, loan and economic variables are as defined in Section 2 (iii). 
In the first nested logit model, we assume that firms choose their preferred security 
between bonds (public or non-bank private) and loans (syndicated or bilateral), and conditional 
on the choice between bonds and loans choose to borrow in a market with dispersed lenders 
(public bonds or syndicated debt) or markets with concentrated lenders (non-bank private debt 
and bilateral loans). In this model, we allow unobserved factors to affect the market choice 
conditional on the security type chosen between bonds and loans (Huang and Ritter, 2009). We 
report the results of this nested logit in Table 8.  
The results for security choice are displayed in model 1 of Table 8. We find that bonds 
are favored by larger firms and by lower credit quality firms. We find evidence of a preferred 
maturity structure for debt, where bonds are issued for longer maturities and by firms who 
already have a higher proportion of long-term debt in their financing structure. Loans, on the 
other hand, are preferred by firms with more fixed assets. For our sample of larger firms, we find 
that loans are also preferred by firms raising larger amounts of financing. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Models 2 and 3 report results for the choice of market to raise debt finance, which is 
conditional on the choice of security in the first model. In model 2 we find that private bonds are 
issued by larger firms, for smaller amounts and for shorter maturities. We find that private bonds 
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are also preferred by bank dependent firms, who we expect have been screened out of public 
debt markets. Private bonds are also preferred over public bonds when term spreads are higher. 
We find less variation in the determinants of bilateral and syndicated loans in model 3, 
conditional on choosing to borrow using a bank loan in the first instance. Firms with higher 
earnings volatility are more likely to borrow in the syndicated loan market, which is consistent 
with syndicated loans being used to reduce the credit risk of individual lenders (see Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000). Conditional on the choice of bank lending, syndicated loans are likely to be 
preferred when Libor rates are lower. 
Table 9 presents the results of our lender choice nested logit model, where firms choose 
between markets with dispersed and concentrated lenders in the first stage, and conditional on 
this choose the type of security preferred in the second stage. In the first stage model 1, we find 
that larger firms, firms with higher fixed assets ratios, and firms borrowing for shorter maturities 
choose to borrow from dispersed groups of lenders. This supports borrower reputation and ease 
of renegotiation theories of debt source whereby high reputation firms with more tangible assets 
are able to borrow from a more dispersed group of lenders. Bank dependent firms are more likely 
to borrow from lending sources characterized by concentrated lenders, as are firms with a higher 
proportion of existing long-term debt. Finally, firms are less likely to borrow from a dispersed 
group of lenders when Libor and term spreads are high. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 Models 2 and 3 of Table 9 report our findings for the choice of security conditional on 
the choice of lending market. We again find that larger firms prefer bonds over loans. Within 
each nest, loans are for shorter maturities but are again raised for larger amounts relative to bond 
financing. Non-bank private debt is preferred over bilateral loans when for firms with a higher 
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proportion of existing long-term debt and when Libor rates are higher. Finally, syndicated loans 
are preferred to public bonds for bank dependent firms and when Libor is higher. This supports 
the theory that bank dependent firms are less likely to be able to access public debt markets, 
which could suggest a hold-up problem where bank dependent firms are restricted to current 
lenders for future finance (Rajan, 1992; Houston and James, 1996).16 This provides some 
evidence that syndicated loans may act as an intermediate source of finance for firms seeking an 
alternative to the public bond market to raise larger amounts of debt financing.17,18 
Overall, oXUILQGLQJVVXSSRUWWKHWKHRU\WKDWDILUP¶VSDVWILQDQFLQJFKRLFHDIIHFWVIXWXUH
financing decisions (Diamond, 1991). We find that bank dependent firms are significantly less 
likely to borrow in public debt markets, but bank dependency has little impact on the choice 
amongst bilateral, syndicated, and non-bank private debt. Firms with large amounts of existing 
bank debt are screened out of public debt markets, which could suggest a hold-up problem where 
bank dependent firms are restricted to current lenders for future finance (Rajan, 1992; Houston 
and James, 1996).19,20 
                                                 
16 5DMDQDUJXHVWKDWFRQWLQXHGUHODWLRQVZLWKRQHEDQNFRXOGUHVXOW LQD³ORFN-LQHIIHFW´%DQNVFDQH[WUDFW
high rents because they acquire monopoly power with respect to private information about the borrowing firm, 
leading to both monopolistic borrowing rates and expensive switching costs.  
17 To further examine the effect of multicollinearity amongst our explanatory variables in this section, we check 
VIFs. This highlighted multicollinearity concerns between Libor and ǻ*'3 and between the Bank dependent and 
the Public debt outstanding dummy variables, which led us to drop ǻ*'3 and Public debt outstanding in the 
multivariate analysis. The remaining VIFs are below 10 for all our variables, which is within the acceptable range 
discussed by Gujarati (2003). 
18 The McFadden pseudo-R squared values reported in Tables 8 and 9 are noticeably higher than the equivalent 
values reported by Denis and Mihov (2003). This is driven by the inclusion of loan maturity as an explanatory 
variable in our regressions. If we exclude loan maturity from out regressions the R squared values are almost 
identical to those reported by Denis and Mihov. We choose to include loan maturity because our univariate analysis 
shows that it is highly correlated with debt source. Moreover, we also check for multicolinearity in this subsequent 
testing to ensure that maturity does not interact with other firm characteristics to lead to spurious regression 
coefficients and we find that the VIF for loan maturity is 1.16, which is again within the acceptable range discussed 
by Gujarati (2003). 
19 In unreported testing we replace Bank dependent with the Public debt outstanding dummy variable described in 
Section 2 (iii). We again find that firms with existing public debt are more likely to borrow from public debt 
markets. The coefficients of public debt, syndicated bank loans, and non-bank private debt are statistically 
insignificant from one another, suggesting that firms with existing public debt outstanding choose amongst these 
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5. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON BORROWING SOURCE 
Our sample time period overlaps with an increase in the difficulty for even the largest firms to 
obtain credit as a result of the global financial crisis that began in late 2007, which could bias our 
analysis of the factors that determine debt source. In this section, we re-estimate our key findings 
WRH[DPLQHWKHLPSDFWRIWKHFULVLVRQWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIDILUP¶VUHSRUWHGEDODnce sheet debt 
source mix and marginal debt financing choice.  
We split the sample into pre- and post-crisis periods for firm years 2000 to 2007 and 
2008 to 2012 and re-estimate our core findings. In Table 10 we re-estimate our analysis of 
existing debt source from Table 4. Panel A reports the results for the pre-crisis period, and Panel 
B for the post-crisis period. We find that splitting the sample into pre- and post-crisis periods 
does affect several determinants of existing debt source. We find that the impact of firm size on 
debt source is consistent across both time periods, although the positive relation between size 
and non-bank private debt use is insignificant in the post-crisis period. The apparently anomalous 
positive impact of earnings volatility on public debt use is confined to the pre-crisis period. We 
find no relation between earnings volatility and debt sourcing in the post-crisis period. 
 [Insert Table 10 about here] 
 In the post-crisis period firm age is positively related to public debt use and negatively 
UHODWHG WR EDQN GHEW 7KLV LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK -RKQVRQ  DQG VXSSRUWV 'LDPRQG¶V 
reputation theory of debt source where only the most reputable firms can access public debt 
markets. The reputation theory is also supported by a positive relation between profitability and 
                                                                                                                                                             
sources based on other firm and loan characteristics, such as maturity, firm size, loan size, and the ability to provide 
collateral.  
20 The general conclusions from this section are largely unchanged when we examine the choice of borrowing 
source using a multinominal logit regression, used in the studies by Denis and Mihov (2003) and Arena (2011).  
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public debt use, and a negative relation between profitability and non-bank private debt use in 
the post-crisis period.21  
We also re-estimate our nested logit regressions of marginal borrowing source from 
Tables 8 and 9 separately for pre- and post-crisis time periods. In general, our findings for the 
role of firm and loan characteristics as determinants of borrowing source are typically stronger 
post-crisis. For Table 8, we find that pre-crisis firms are more likely to choose loan over bond 
markets where they have high leverage and borrow for shorter maturities. The choice amongst 
non-bank private debt and public bonds is unrelated to the firm, credit market, and loan variables 
that we consider in this study. Bilateral loans are preferred to syndicated loans for smaller, 
younger, less profitable, and weaker credit quality firms borrowing relatively larger amounts and 
over shorter maturities. During the pre-crisis period, the choice of bilateral loans relative to 
syndicated loans is negatively related to term spreads and Libor. 
Post-crisis we find that loans are preferred again for larger borrowing amounts over 
shorter maturities. We also find weak evidence that firm size, profitability, investment 
opportunities, and earnings volatility influence the choice between bond and loan market 
borrowing. In second stage regression of the choice between concentrated and dispersed lenders 
we find that a number of firm characteristics are related to borrowing source choice in a manner 
that indicates lenders placing a greater emphasis on borrowing firm creditworthiness in their 
lending decisions. In all regression models we find that loans and borrowing from a concentrated 
number of lenders is SUHIHUUHG E\ EDQN GHSHQGHQW ILUPV ZKLFK LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 'LDPRQG¶V
                                                 
21 We also re-estimate our regression results and replace year dummies with a Financial crisis dummy set equal to 
one for all firm±years from 2008 onwards, and zero otherwise. We find that the crisis dummy variable is unrelated 
to debt source and has little impact on the remaining coefficients so as to impact our overall conclusions on the 
determinants of existing debt source. Thus, the financial crisis itself did not have a significant effect on the 
accumulated proportion of debt borrowed from individual borrowing sources. We do not report the results of this 
test for brevity but the findings are available on request. 
34 
 
UHSXWDWLRQDOWKHRU\RIDILUP¶VERUURZLQJKLVWRU\7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIDILUP¶VGHSHQGHQFH
on bank debt as an existing source of borrowing in the post-crisis time period points towards 
OHQGHUV SODFLQJ D JUHDWHU HPSKDVLV RQ D ERUURZLQJ ILUP¶V FUHGLW KLVWRU\ DQG UHSXWDWLRQ LQ
deciding whom to lend to. 
We find similar evidence when we re-estimate Table 9 for pre- and post-crisis time 
periods, although firm characteristics are less important when examining security choice 
conditional on the number of lenders in first stage regressions. Larger firms prefer to borrow 
from dispersed lenders and prefer bonds over loans and this relation holds over both time 
periods. We again find that firms classified as bank dependent are more likely to borrow in loan 
markets over both time periods, but conditional on loan market borrowing bank dependency 
affects borrowing security choice only in the post-crisis time period. This again suggests that 
lenders tightened their credit screening process in the post-crisis period relative to the period of 
credit expansion prior to 2008. 
Collectively, our analysis of debt sourcing surrounding the global financial crisis supports 
the EDVLFWHQDQWVRI'LDPRQG¶VUHSXWDWLRQWKHRU\RIGHEWVRXUFLQJ:HILQGWKDWILUPVL]H
firm age is an important predictor of debt source in the post-crisis period when credit was most 
rationed and when borrower reputation was likely to matter most to lenders. Moreover, existing 
dependency on bank debt is unrelated to borrowing source in the pre-crisis period when lenders 
placed less emphasis on borrower reputation in their lending decisions during the period of credit 
expansion. Post-crisis we find that bank dependent firms are more likely to borrow in loan 
markets, and conditional on lender and security issuance choice are screened out of public bond 
markets. 
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6. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
This section extends our main analysis to consider a number of robustness tests to our main 
testing procedures and our results.22 First, when analyzing incremental financing decisions we 
focus on firms borrowing from a single source during the financial year. This allows us to isolate 
discrete debt choices but leads to a number of observations being dropped from our initial 
sample. Table 5 highlights that filtering for overlapping debt issuance results in a 
disproportionate loss of public bonds and non-bank private debt issues. To address concerns of 
selection bias caused by these exclusions, we re-estimate our nested logit regressions and include 
firm±years where firms borrow from more than one source. We find the sequence of loan 
announcements over time, and across alternative sources, closely tracks the figures reported in 
Table 5 for the full and the filtered sample, confirming that our initial decision to exclude 
overlapping issuers does not alter the general pattern of loan announcements over our sample 
period relative to the population of loan issuance by our sample. When we repeat the regression 
analysis of marginal financing source determinants from Tables 8 and 9 we find again that firm 
size and existing debt source are the key drivers of debt source in marginal financing decisions. 
Larger firms are more likely to borrow from public and non-bank private debt sources and firms 
with a higher proportion of long-term debt in their existing borrowings are less likely to borrow 
using syndicated and bilateral bank loans. Bank dependent firms remain less likely to borrow in 
public debt markets.  
Second, Diamond (1991) suggests that financially distressed firms are more likely to 
borrow from non-traditional sources of finance. Including financially distressed firms could bias 
our results and suggest a greater importance for non-bank private debt than is typical for a 
population of financially healthy firms. Therefore, we examine the sensitivity of our regressions 
                                                 
22 The results of this section are not tabulated for brevity but are available on request.  
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in Tables 4, 8 and 9 by excluding financially distressed firms to consider whether our findings 
are driven by the unique borrowing preferences of distressed firms. The negative impact of 
investment on public debt sourcing from Table 4 is now insignificant, but otherwise we see no 
significant difference in our analysis of existing debt source. Excluding financially distressed 
firm±years from Tables 8 and 9 has no impact on the coefficients for firm, loan and economic 
characteristics on marginal borrowing source. Bank dependent borrowers remain more likely to 
borrow from concentrated lenders and are less likely to borrow in public bond markets relative to 
syndicated loans. However, excluding financially distressed firms leads to the Bank dependent 
variable becoming insignificant in the remaining regressions. This suggests that existing 
financing relationships matter most for potentially constrained firms who would otherwise have 
difficulty in accessing external financing.  
Third, when analyzing incremental financing decisions we examine each loan in 
isolation, without considering the financing choices of individual companies in prior years. We 
partly address this in Tables 8 and 9 where we examine cumulative past financing decisions on 
WKH ILUP¶V EDODQFH VKHHW DQG WKHLU LPSDFW RQ LQFUHPHQWDO ILQDQFLQJ FKRLFHV +RZHYHU LW LV
SRVVLEOHWKDWILUPV¶PRUHUHFHQWERUURZLQJGHFLVLRQVIURPGLIIHUHQWVRXUFHVFRXOGLQIOXHQFHWKH
choice of future financing sources. To examine this issue we re-estimate our multinomial logit 
regressions from Tables 8 and 9 including dummy variables that capture whether firms borrowed 
from public, syndicated or bilateral bank or non-bank private debt sources in the previous year. 
Each dummy variable is set equal to one if the firm raised debt from the relevant borrowing 
source in the previous financial year, and zero otherwise. Including these additional lags reduces 
the sample size from 629 to 599 debt transactions. We find that firms issuing a public bond in the 
previous year are more likely to do so in the current year relative to all borrowing sources. The 
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strength of the Bank dependent variable from Tables 8 and 9 in the main paper is again 
weakened, VXJJHVWLQJUHFHQW ILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQVDUH LPSRUWDQW WRXQGHUVWDQGD ILUP¶VPDUJLQDO
borrowing source choice, and potentially more so than the accumulation of past borrowing 
decisions measured by our bank dependency variable. Otherwise, there is little evidence that the 
debt source in the last year impacts our core results.  
Fourth, Diamond (1984) argues that banks have information advantages over other 
lenders. It is possible that because of the superior information that banks have there could be a 
difference between large loans made by banks and large loans from public sources. To address 
this concern, we estimate logit regressions of the likelihood of issuing a large publicly traded 
bond relative to a large bank loan, and against the likelihood of issuing a large syndicated loan 
for our sample firms. A large loan is defined as a loan that is larger than the median loan size of 
both public and bank loans. The results are generally mixed with respect to our core results in 
Tables 8 and 9&RQVLVWHQWZLWK'LDPRQG¶VUHSXWDWLRQ WKHRU\ZHDJDLQILQG WKDW ODUJHU
and more profitable firms are more likely to issue public debt. Firms with higher investment 
spending and weaker interest coverage are more likely to borrow from public debt sources, 
which contradicts life cycle and reputation based theories, but is consistent with a supply 
explanation where banks are unwilling to provide very large loans to risky firms with large 
investment requirements. After controlling for other factors, larger and shorter maturity loans are 
raised through banks. We find no relation between existing debt source and the likelihood of 
issuing public relative to bank debt. While initially contrary to our earlier findings, this evidence 
suggests that firms raising the largest amounts of financing are not constrained by their existing 
borrowing source. 
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Finally, our results in Tables 2 and 4 are based on pooled firm±year observations and 
could be subject to endogeneity or serial correlation problems that are not remedied by the 
instrumental variable procedure for existing leverage or the inclusion of year dummies. To 
address this concern, we re-estimate our results using debt source data for 2003 and relate this to 
firm characteristics that are three year averages estimated from 2000 to 2002. Johnson (1997) 
argues that taking average values for independent variables and lagging these prior to the 
dependent variable removes extreme values and mitigates simultaneity concerns in his analysis 
of existing balance sheet debt.23 Our core results for firm size are unchanged and we again find 
that the proportion of bank debt is increasing with the fixed assets ratio, although the negative 
coefficient for non-bank private debt becomes marginally insignificant. Earnings volatility is 
positively related to the use of long term non-bank private debt and negatively related to long 
term bank debt. Although consistent with our analysis of marginal financing decisions, we find 
no relation between public debt use and earnings volatility. These findings strengthen our core 
result on the importance of firm size and collateral as determinants of existing debt source.  
  
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we examine the choice of debt source for a sample of large non-financial UK firms 
over the period 2000 to 2012. We study the determinants of existing debt source and the choice 
of debt source for incremental financing decisions. We distinguish between existing public debt, 
bank debt and non-bank private debt, and between bilateral and syndicated banks loans. This 
allows us to simultaneously examine a broader range of debt financing sources than previously 
considered in the empirical research in this area. We use this classification to investigate 
                                                 
23 We do not report these findings in our core analysis following Christie et al. (1984), who are critical of 
orthogonalization to control for endogeneity since the regression itself partials out the effects of other variables. 
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'LDPRQG¶V  UHSXWDWLRQ EDVed theory of debt source choice where firms with difficult to 
monitor assets and who naturally generate less information for investors are screened out of 
public debt markets. 
2XUILQGLQJVSURYLGHVXSSRUWIRU'LDPRQG¶VWKHRU\RIGHEWVRXUFHFKRLFHSmaller 
firms and firms with fewer tangible assets are screened out of public debt markets. We provide 
mixed evidence on whether syndicated bank loans act as an intermediate step between bilateral 
bank loans and publicly traded bonds within the context of a wider range of financing choices 
(Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007). This effect is present prior to the global financial 
crisis, but is not present post-2008. Moreover, syndicated loans also allow firms to raise larger 
amounts of financing than publicly traded debt, which does not fit easily within borrower 
reputation or liquidation efficiency theories of debt source choice. Our findings on the 
importance of fixed assets as collateral support theories of debt source based on liquidation 
efficiency where firms with more difficult to value intangible assets are more likely to choose 
private debt sources.  
Our findings raise a number of important issues for future research. The fact that we find 
little role for financial distress and credit risk suggests these are unimportant for borrowing 
decisions by UK firms, that our proxies are imperfect or that credit risk is less important when 
analyzing a sample of large firms. We chose FTSE-350 firms in this study to ensure availability 
of loan announcement data and to focus on firms that are more likely to have a range of choice of 
debt source. It is possible that credit risk is more important in determining debt source choice 
between large and small firms.  
More generally, our findings on non-bank private debt and bilateral and syndicated loans 
highlight the importance of considering a broader range of financing choices in corporate finance 
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research. The broad heading of non-bank private debt covers a range of discrete debt sources that 
are worthy of further investigation. These include direct loans from institutional investors and 
private bonds. Further detailed analysis of debt classified under this heading will require a longer 
time frame and broader range of sample firms. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for sample firms 
This table presents selected summary statistics for a sample of 400 firms listed in the FTSE-350 index of the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2000 and 2012. The sample is constructed by including all firms listed in the FTSE-
350, excluding financials and utilities, during the period 2000-2012 for the years that they were listed in the FTSE-
350. Firm size is measured as the book value of total assets (£millions) deflated to 2000 sterling figures using the 
UK consumer price inflation index. Firm age is measured from the date of incorporation. Fixed assets ratio is 
defined as the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets. Specialized industry is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of one for firms with SIC code between 3400 and 3999, and zero otherwise. Investment is defined as 
the sum of capital expenditures and research and development spending divided by total assets. Earnings volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of pretax income minus incomes taxes for the previous three years divided by the 
average total assets for the period. Return on assets is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization to total assets. Interest coverage is calculated as EBITDA divided by total interest 
payable. Leverage is measured as the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. All debt ratio 
figures are based on book values. Long-term debt is defined as debt with a maturity greater than one year.  
 
Mean Median Max Min Std Dev 
No of 
observations 
Firm size 3,500 1,100 170,000 5.30 10,611 2529 
Firm age 42.35 27.00 164.00 1.00 36.83 2337 
Fixed assets ratio 0.29 0.21 0.98 0.00 0.24 2520 
Specialized industry 0.16 
    
2563 
Investment 0.06 0.05 0.98 0.00 0.07 2527 
Earnings volatility 0.04 0.02 1.45 0.00 0.07 2468 
Return on assets 0.13 0.13 1.05 -1.80 0.12 2528 
Leverage 0.30 0.23 68.85 0.00 1.48 2529 
Interest coverage 30.76 8.31 16,514.33 -454.80 344.96 2559 
Public debt to total debt 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.35 2563 
Bank debt to total debt 0.60 0.71 1.00 0.00 0.40 2563 
Non-bank private debt to total debt 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.29 2563 
Long-term public debt to total 
long-term debt 
0.28 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.39 2343 
Long-term bank debt to total long-
term debt 
0.54 0.56 1.00 0.00 0.43 2343 
Long-term non-bank private debt to 
total long-term debt 
0.18 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 2343 
Fraction of firms with any public 
debt outstanding  
0.42 
    
2563 
Fraction of firms with any bank 
debt outstanding 
0.95 
    
2563 
Fraction of firms with any non-
bank private debt outstanding 
0.43 
    
2563 
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Table 2 
Univariate comparison of sample firms by main borrowing source 
This table presents mean (median) comparisons of firm variables for a sample of 400 firms listed in the FTSE-350 
index of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2000 and 2012. Sample construction and variable definitions 
are provided in Table 1. Firm years are allocated to sub groups according to the largest proportion of their reported 
WRWDOGHEWRXWVWDQGLQJLQWKDW\HDU³PRVWO\SXEOLF´³PRVWO\EDQN´DQG³PRVWO\QRQ-EDQNSULYDWH´6uperscripts 1, 2, 
and 3 denote that firm characteristics for firms borrowing predominantly from one debt source are significantly 
different at the 5% level or greater from those borrowing predominantly from the borrowing source in the 
corresponding numbered columns. The significance of the difference in means is determined using a t-test of means. 
The significance of the differences in medians is determined in using the Kruskal-Wallis Test, and the significance 
of the differences in proportions is determined using the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. 
  Firms with mostly public 
debt outstanding 
Firms with mostly bank 
debt outstanding 
Firms with mostly non-
bank private debt 
outstanding 
 
(N=614) (N=1284) (N=350) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Firm size 6,9732 1,3361,3 4,8232 
 
(2,950)2,3 (640)1,3 (1,350)1,2 
Firm age 49.882 39.181,3 45.032 
 
(32.00)2,3 (25.00)1,3 (37.50)1,2 
Fixed assets ratio 0.313 0.293 0.241,2 
 
(0.22)2,3 (0.21)1,3 (0.19)1,2 
Specialized industry 0.132 0.171 0.17 
Investment  0.062 0.071 0.06 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Earnings volatility 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
(0.02)2 (0.02)1,3 (0.02)2 
Return on Assets 0.132 0.141,3 0.122 
 
(0.13)2 (0.14)1,3 (0.12)2 
Leverage 0.302 0.221,3 0.272 
 
(0.28)2,3 (0.20)1 (0.21)1 
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Table 3 
Pairwise correlations of explanatory variables for existing debt source determinants  
This table presents the correlation matrix of selected variables of existing debt source for a sample of 400 firms 
listed in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2000 and 2012. Sample construction 
and variable definitions are provided in Table 1. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Ln (Firm 
size) 
Ln (Firm 
age) 
Fixed assets 
ratio 
Specialized 
industry 
Investment 
Earnings 
volatility 
Return on 
assets 
Ln (Firm 
age) 
0.1344*** 
      
(0.000) 
      
Fixed assets 
ratio 
0.0844*** 0.0214 
     
(0.000) (0.306) 
     
Specialized 
industry 
-0.1088*** 0.1865*** -0.1560*** 
    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Investment 
-0.1485*** -0.1385*** 0.3269*** 0.0731*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Earnings 
volatility 
-0.1520*** -0.0661*** -0.0989*** -0.0017 0.1054*** 
  
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.932) (0.000) 
  
Return on 
assets 
-0.1196*** -0.0522** 0.0697*** 0.0011 0.1398*** -0.2352*** 
 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.956) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Leverage 
-0.0283 0.0448** -0.0101 -0.0199 -0.0213 -0.0105 -0.0174 
(0.156) (0.032) (0.612) (0.318) (0.285) (0.604) (0.383) 
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Table 4 
Determinants of balance sheet debt source 
This table presents the results of second stage instrumental variable Tobit regressions of debt source for a sample of 
400 firms listed in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2000 and 2012. Sample 
construction and variable definitions are provided in Table 1. The dependent variable is censored between zero and 
one. The unreported first stage regression of the determinants of leverage and long-term leverage use cash divided 
by total assets as the instrumental variable. Year dummy variables are included in the regressions but are not 
reported for brevity. P-values derived from standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote the parameters are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
  
Public debt 
to total debt 
Bank debt to 
total debt 
Non-bank 
private debt 
to total debt 
Long-term 
public debt 
to total 
long-term 
debt 
Long-term 
bank debt to 
total long-
term debt 
Long-term 
non-bank 
private debt 
to total 
long-term 
debt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
-6.4140*** 5.4519*** -1.8922*** -8.7610*** 6.2259*** -1.4694 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.143) 
Ln (Firm size) 
0.2923*** -0.2439*** 0.0958*** 0.3924*** -0.3077*** 0.0907** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) 
Ln (Firm age) 
0.0464 -0.0438 0.0231 0.0759* -0.0383 0.0013 
(0.108) (0.254) (0.493) (0.069) (0.597) (0.984) 
Fixed assets ratio 
0.3255 -0.2829 0.0020 0.4799 -0.7967 0.3220 
(0.166) (0.286) (0.993) (0.235) (0.179) (0.497) 
Specialized industry 
-0.0445 0.037 0.0412 -0.0966 0.1456 0.0392 
(0.702) (0.709) (0.680) (0.571) (0.412) (0.821) 
Investment  
-0.5585 0.1774 0.1488 -0.7413 1.0211 -0.4175 
(0.237) (0.752) (0.787) (0.322) (0.411) (0.732) 
Earnings volatility 
1.1513*** -0.6645** -0.1934 1.7253*** -1.6647** -0.0209 
(0.000) (0.045) (0.561) (0.000) (0.026) (0.975) 
Return on assets 
0.2140 0.1223 -0.2854 0.7489 -0.7407 0.0590 
(0.419) (0.665) (0.226) (0.134) (0.293) (0.920) 
Leverage 
-0.4136 2.5502* -1.6393 -0.8818 6.4015** -4.3922* 
(0.772) (0.062) (0.191) (0.714) (0.037) (0.100) 
/5Ȥ 158.06*** 76.66*** 25.33 116.25*** 44.40*** 14.71 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.150) (0.000) (0.001) (0.741) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1287.2515 -1425.8806 -1372.4889 -996.9980 -1332.4221 -1105.0448 
Partial F-statistic for 
first stage leverage 
regression 
 
4.16*** 
(0.000) 
  
3.15*** 
(0.000) 
 
No of observations 2248 2248 2248 2050 2050 2050 
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Table 5 
Distribution of loan announcing firms over time 
The table reports the yearly distribution of announcements of debt offerings for a sample of 400 firms listed in the 
FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2000 and 2012. Loans announcements are made in 
the subsequent financial year. Sample construction is described in Table 1. Results are reported separately for 
issuance of public bonds, syndicated bank loans, bilateral bank loans, and non-bank private debt. Panel A presents 
our initial sample of loan announcements across announcing years and source of borrowing. Panel B excludes firm 
years where firms borrow from more than one source during the financial year. In years where firms have multiple 
loans from a single source during the financial year we include these in our sample and use the loan characteristics 
from the first announcement during the financial year. 
Year Public debt Bank loan 
Syndicated bank 
loan 
Bilateral bank 
loan 
Non-bank 
private debt 
      Panel A: Distribution of debt financing sources over time 
2001 36 [10.81%] 35 [4.20%] 32 [4.80%] 3 [1.80%] 17 [8.59%] 
2002 38 [11.41%] 43 [5.16%] 37 [5.55%] 6  [3.59%] 22 [11.11%] 
2003 42 [12.61%] 55 [6.59%] 52 [7.80%] 3 [1.80%] 25 [12.63%] 
2004 38 [11.41%] 77 [9.23%] 70 [10.49%] 7  [4.19%] 11 [5.56%] 
2005 21 [6.31%] 91 [10.91%] 78 [11.69%] 13 [7.78%] 11 [5.56%] 
2006 35 [10.51%] 69 [8.13%] 63 [9.45%] 6 [3.59%] 23 [11.62%] 
2007 36 [10.81%] 63 [7.55%] 53 [7.95%] 10 [5.99%] 18 [9.09%] 
2008 30 [9.01%] 64 [7.67%] 49 [7.35%] 15 [8.98%] 16 [8.08%] 
2009 16 [4.80%] 45 [5.40%] 29 [4.35%] 16 [9.58%] 11 [5.56%] 
2010 6 [1.80%] 67 [8.03%] 54 [8.10%] 13 [7.78%] 14 [7.07%] 
2011 9 [2.70%] 102 [12.23%] 70 [10.49%] 32 [19.16%] 12 [6.06%] 
2012 15 [4.50%] 62 [7.43%] 38 [5.70%] 24 [14.37%] 10 [5.05%] 
2013 11 [3.30%] 61 [7.31%] 42 [6.30%] 19 [11.38%] 8 [4.04%] 
Total 333 [100.00%] 834 [100.00%] 667 [100.00%] 167 [100.00%] 198 [100.00%] 
Panel B: Distribution of single issuing firms years over time 
2001 14 [10.77%] 10 [2.30%] 10 [2.83%] 0 [0.00%] 6 [9.38%] 
2002 12 [9.23%] 17 [3.91%] 15 [4.25%] 2 [2.44%] 6 [9.38%] 
2003 12 [9.23%] 23 [5.29%] 23 [6.52%] 0 [0.00%] 9 [14.06%] 
2004 15 [11.53%] 27 [6.21%] 25 [7.08%] 2 [2.44%] 2 [3.13%] 
2005 7 [5.38%] 41 [9.43%] 38 [10.76%] 3 [3.66%] 3 [4.69%] 
2006 16 [12.31%] 29 [6.67%] 28 [7.93%] 1 [1.22%] 7 [10.94%] 
2007 15 [11.54%] 34 [7.82%] 31 [8.78%] 3 [3.66%] 5 [7.81%] 
2008 13 [10.00%] 30 [6.90%] 26 [7.37%] 4 [4.88%] 4 [6.25%] 
2009 7 [5.38%] 23 [5.29%] 16 [4.53%] 7 [8.54%] 4 [6.25%] 
2010 1 [0.77%] 45 [10.34%] 37 [10.46%] 8 [9.75%] 5 [7.81%] 
2011 2 [1.54%] 72 [16.55%] 49 [13.88%] 23 [28.05%] 5 [7.81%] 
2012 11 [8.46%] 41 [9.43%] 26 [7.37%] 15 [18.29%] 4 [6.25%] 
2013 5 [3.85%] 43 [9.89%] 29 [8.22%] 14 [17.07%] 4 [6.25%] 
Total 130 [100.00%] 435 [100.00%] 353 [100.00%] 82 [100.00%] 64 [100.00%] 
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Table 6 
Firm and loan characteristics for marginal borrowing decisions 
This table presents mean (median) comparisons for firms borrowing from public, syndicated bank, bilateral bank, 
and non-bank private sources for 400 firms listed in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
between 2000 and 2012. All firm characteristics are measured at the year-end prior to the loan announcement. Credit 
quality is based on low interest coverage and is a dummy variable set to one where the interest coverage ratio is less 
than 0.8, or less than 1 in two consecutive years. Loan size is the value of the loan deflated to the year 2000. Loan 
maturity is measured as the years to maturity for each loan. ¨ GDP is the percentage change in gross domestic 
product during the quarter where the debt announcement was made. Libor is the United Kingdom Interbank 3 month 
offer rate on the date that the announcement was made expressed in percentage terms. Term spread is defined as the 
spread between 10-year UK Government bonds and 3-month T-bills, also expressed in percentage terms. Bank 
dependent is a dummy set to one where the proportion of outstanding bank debt is greater than the median for 
sample firms and the firm has no public debt, and zero otherwise. Public debt outstanding is a dummy set to one if 
the firm has any public debt outstanding, and zero otherwise. Sample construction and all remaining variable 
definitions are provided in Table 1. Superscripts are significantly different from the mean (median) or fraction where 
appropriate in the corresponding numbered column at the 5% level or greater. The significance of the difference in 
means is determined using a t-test of means. The significance of the differences in medians is determined in using 
the Kruskal-Wallis Test, and the significance of the differences in proportions is determined using the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum Test. 
  
Public debt 
(N=130) 
Syndicated bank 
loan 
(N=353) 
Bilateral bank 
loan 
(N=82) 
Non-bank private 
debt 
(N=64) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm size 
12,1142,3,4 3,0751,3,4 1,9711,2 2,0271,2 
(5,460)2,4 (1,373)1,3 (773)2,4 (1,457)1,3 
Firm age 
47.68 44.19 39.56 43.33 
(30.50) (27.00) (25.00) (25.50) 
Fixed assets ratio 
0.362,3,4 0.291,4 0.271 0.211,2 
(0.29)2,3,4 (0.21)1,4 (0.19)1 (0.14)1,2 
Specialized industry 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.14 
Investment  
0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 
(0.05)4 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)1 
Earnings volatility 
0.032 0.041 0.03 0.03 
(0.02)2 (0.02)1 (0.02) (0.02) 
Leverage 
0.313,4 0.303 0.221,2 0.261 
(0.29)2,3 (0.23)1,3 (0.20)1,2 (0.25) 
Return on assets 
0.15 0.12 0.14 0.14 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Credit quality  0.09 0.144 0.09 0.062 
Loan size (£millions) 
2502,4 3871,3,4 2262,4 991,2,3 
(196)2,4 (274) 1,3,4 (195) 2,4 (70) 1,2,3 
Loan size / total assets 
0.072,3 0.251,4 0.251,4 0.062,3 
(0.03)2,3 (0.21) 1,4 (0.18) 1,4 (0.03) 2,3 
Loan maturity 
12.102,3,4 4.011,4 3.721,4 8.551,2,3 
(7.42) 2,3 (5.00) 1,4 (4.04) 1,4 (10.00) 2,3 
¨*'3 0.513 0.453 0.211,2 0.43 
(0.59)3 (0.58)3 (0.45)1,2,4 (0.65)3 
Libor  
3.992,3,4 3.061,3 1.591,2,4 3.361,3 
(4.55)2,3,4 (3.63)1,3 (0.83)1,2,4 (3.95)1,3 
Term spread 
0.572,3,4 1.101,3 1.891,2,4 0.961,3 
(0.37)2,3,4 (0.98)1,3 (2.12) 1,2,4 (0.90)1,3 
Percentage debt due in excess of 1 year 
0.773 0.73 0.661,4 0.773 
(0.83) (0.87) (0.83) (0.89) 
Fraction of bank dependent firms 0.072,3,4 0.381 0.451 0.341 
Fraction with public debt outstanding 0.812,3,4 0.451,3 0.321,2 0.411 
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Table 7 
Analysis of new debt issues relative to existing borrowing sources 
This table reports the number (proportion) of firm year observations of public debt, syndicated bank loans, bilateral 
bank loans, and non-bank private debt issues sorted by existing debt for a sample of 400 firms listed on the FTSE-
350 index of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2000 and 2012. Sample construction is described in Table 
1. Sample issuers are split into five groups; issuers with both public and non-bank private debt outstanding, issuers 
with public debt outstanding, but no non-bank private debt outstanding, issuers with non-bank private debt 
outstanding, but no public debt outstanding, issuers with neither public or non-bank private debt outstanding, and 
issuers with no outstanding debt. 
  
Prior public 
and non-
bank private 
debt 
outstanding 
Prior public 
debt 
outstanding, 
but no non-
bank private 
debt 
outstanding 
Prior non-
bank private 
debt 
outstanding, 
but no public 
debt 
outstanding 
No public or 
non-bank 
private debt 
outstanding 
No debt 
outstanding 
Total 
Public debt 45 (0.35) 60 (0.32) 17 (0.13) 4 (0.03) 4 (0.19) 130 (0.21) 
Syndicated bank loan 66 (0.51) 94 (0.50) 77 (0.57) 106 (0.68) 10 (0.48) 353 (0.56) 
Bilateral bank loan 11 (0.08) 15 (0.08) 19 (0.14) 30 (0.19) 7 (0.33) 82 (0.13) 
Non-bank private debt 8 (0.06) 18 (0.10) 22 (0.16) 16 (0.10) 0 (0.00) 64 (0.10) 
Total 130 (1.00) 187 (1.00) 135 (1.00) 156 (1.00) 21 (1.00) 629 (1.00) 
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Table 8 
Nested logit regressions of borrowing source determinants conditional on choice between bonds and loans   
This table reports nested logit regressions of borrowing source between public, syndicated bank, bilateral bank, and 
non-bank private sources for a sample of 400 firms listed in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) between 2000 and 2012. All firm characteristics are measured at the financial year end prior to the issue 
announcement. Sample construction and variable definitions are provided in Tables 1 and 5. P-values derived from 
standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the parameters are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
  First Stage: security choice Second Stage: number of lenders 
 
Loan versus bond 
Non-bank private debt 
versus public debt 
Bilateral bank loan 
versus syndicated 
bank loan 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (Firm size) 
-2.0804*** 0.2111*** 0.0267 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.699) 
Ln (Firm age) 
0.0253 0.0124 0.0657 
(0.940) (0.890) (0.584) 
Fixed assets ratio 
4.9638*** -1.5923*** -0.6198 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.283) 
Specialized industry 
-0.6598 0.4312 -0.2058 
(0.728) (0.252) (0.581) 
Investment 
3.9594 -2.3562 0.7732 
(0.629) (0.247) (0.791) 
Earnings volatility 
2.6729 -0.5464 -6.2265* 
(0.816) (0.852) (0.090) 
ROA 
-9.8876 3.0679* 1.8843 
(0.101) (0.065) (0.304) 
Leverage 
1.9330 -1.4138* -0.3376 
(0.511) (0.075) (0.666) 
Credit quality 
-4.9704** 1.0383** -0.3718 
(0.050) (0.021) (0.407) 
Ln (Loan size) 
2.9570*** -0.3344*** -0.0668 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.330) 
Loan maturity 
-0.7403*** -0.0331* 0.0076 
(0.001) (0.057) (0.957) 
Libor 
-1.4348 0.1284 -0.3382** 
(0.103) (0.294) (0.016) 
Term spread 
-1.8570* 0.3951** 0.0360 
(0.065) (0.040) (0.874) 
Proportion long-term debt 
-3.9720** 0.7732 -0.2024 
(0.033) (0.146) (0.688) 
Bank dependent 
-1.2481 0.5371* 0.2375 
(0.321) (0.062) (0.345) 
    /5Ȥ2 893.32   (0.000) 
  Pseudo R2 0.5122 
  Log likelihood -425.32 
  No of observations 629 
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Table 9 
Nested logit regressions of borrowing source determinants conditional on choice between dispersed and 
concentrated lenders 
This table reports nested logit regressions of borrowing source between public, syndicated bank, bilateral bank, and 
non-bank private sources for a sample of 400 firms listed in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) between 2000 and 2012. All firm characteristics are measured at the financial year end prior to the issue 
announcement. Sample construction and variable definitions are provided in Tables 1 and 5. P-values derived from 
standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the parameters are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
  
First stage: number of 
lenders 
Second stage: security choice 
 
Concentrated lenders 
versus dispersed 
lenders 
Syndicated bank loan 
versus public debt 
Bilateral bank loan 
versus non-bank private 
debt 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (Firm size) 
-0.4178*** -0.8381*** -0.8826*** 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln (Firm age) 
0.1463 0.0815 0.0862 
(0.473) (0.506) (0.553) 
Fixed assets ratio 
-3.1971*** 0.4730 1.3626* 
(0.010) (0.452) (0.094) 
Specialized industry 
0.1676 0.7074 0.7233 
(0.824) (0.128) (0.173) 
Investment 
1.0625 -4.0125 -4.3389 
(0.805) (0.202) (0.229) 
Earnings volatility 
9.3860 6.1761 3.0928 
(0.233) (0.128) (0.456) 
Return on assets 
-1.2730 -1.7203 -1.5487 
(0.684) (0.257) (0.355) 
Leverage 
-1.5788 -0.3948 -0.3435 
(0.290) (0.109) (0.539) 
Credit quality 
-0.2788 -0.2179 -0.2972 
(0.811) (0.673) (0.619) 
Ln (Loan size) 
0.2981 1.2329*** 1.3812*** 
(0.113) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loan maturity 
-0.1177** -0.6457*** -0.7621*** 
(0.026) (0.000) (0.000) 
Libor 
0.5208** -0.2235 -0.5124** 
(0.031) (0.147) (0.011) 
Term spread 
1.2128*** -0.0198 -0.3379 
(0.005) (0.938) (0.228) 
Proportion long-term debt 
2.7438** -0.6246 -1.6635** 
(0.026) (0.285) (0.026) 
Bank dependent 
2.8686*** 1.0564*** 0.4609 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.210) 
    /5Ȥ2 882.62   
(0.000) 
  
Pseudo R2 0.5061 
  
Log likelihood -430.67 
  
No of observations 629 
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Table 10 
Determinants of balance sheet debt source surrounding the global financial crisis 
This table presents the results of second stage instrumental variable Tobit regressions of debt source for a sample of 
400 firms listed in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2000 and 2012, split into two 
periods 2000 to 2007 and 2008 to 2012. Sample construction and variable definitions are provided in Table 1. The 
dependent variable is censored between zero and one. The unreported first stage regression of the determinants of 
leverage and long-term leverage use cash divided by total assets as the instrumental variable. Year dummy variables 
are included in the regressions but are not reported for brevity. P-values derived from standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the parameters are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively.  
Panel A: Debt source 2000-2007 
  
Public debt 
to total debt 
Bank debt 
to total debt 
Non-bank 
private debt 
to total debt 
Long-term 
public debt 
to total 
long-term 
debt 
Long-term 
bank debt 
to total 
long-term 
debt 
Long-term 
non-bank 
private debt 
to total 
long-term 
debt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
-5.9741*** 5.2816*** -1.9257*** -8.3907*** 5.9583*** -1.2056 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.363) 
Ln (Firm size) 
0.2840*** -0.2437*** 0.1091*** 0.3858*** -0.3160*** 0.1079* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) 
Ln (Firm age) 
-0.0102 0.0118 -0.0043 0.0092 0.0710 -0.0810 
(0.754) (0.759) (0.912) (0.867) (0.386) (0.369) 
Fixed assets ratio 
0.2373 -0.1930 0.0831 0.3269 -0.8315 0.6223 
(0.328) (0.381) (0.714) (0.474) (0.134) (0.282) 
Specialized industry 
-0.0156 -0.0317 0.0695 -0.0601 0.0204 0.1018 
(0.904) (0.751) (0.492) (0.748) (0.912) (0.589) 
Investment  
-0.2175 -0.1096 0.3154 -0.3060 0.5631 -0.2809 
(0.677) (0.823) (0.569) (0.704) (0.601) (0.835) 
Earnings volatility 
1.0401*** -0.7548** 0.0315 1.6007*** -1.8964** 0.4597 
(0.001) (0.015) (0.923) (0.001) (0.012) (0.519) 
Return on assets 
0.0288 0.0304 -0.0590 0.3412 -0.8698 0.6148 
(0.897) (0.901) (0.800) (0.452) (0.202) (0.366) 
Leverage 
-0.4404 2.1218 -1.8471 -0.2608 6.0849* -5.7229 
(0.797) (0.157) (0.259) (0.927) (0.080) (0.120) 
/5Ȥ 102.11*** 70.38*** 15.53 86.16*** 38.92*** 7.02 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.4138) (0.000) (0.007) (0.957) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -898.1968 -970.2065 -964.1450 -670.0609 -909.9248 -762.0340 
Partial F-statistic for first 
stage leverage regression  
2.88 
(0.0003)   
2.70 
(0.0007)  
No of observations 1533 1533 1533 1384 1384 1384 
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Panel B: Debt source 2008-20012 
  
Public debt 
to total debt 
Bank debt 
to total debt 
Non-bank 
private debt 
to total debt 
Long-term 
public debt 
to total 
long-term 
debt 
Long-term 
bank debt 
to total 
long-term 
debt 
Long-term 
non-bank 
private debt 
to total 
long-term 
debt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
-7.6225*** 5.6914*** -1.2229 -9.7990*** 6.5197*** -1.1540 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.170) (0.000) (0.002) (0.316) 
Ln (Firm size) 
0.3224*** -0.2460*** 0.0671 0.4218*** -0.3039*** 0.0578 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.000) (0.003) (0.277) 
Ln (Firm age) 
0.1904*** -0.2145*** 0.0793 0.2847*** -0.3140** 0.0891 
(0.002) (0.007) (0.239) (0.005) (0.018) (0.342) 
Fixed assets ratio 
0.6366* -0.6111 -0.1324 1.0563 -0.8080 -0.2477 
(0.081) (0.372) (0.746) (0.135) (0.555) (0.676) 
Specialized industry 
-0.1081 0.2237 0.0381 -0.2780 0.4710 0.0936 
(0.529) (0.223) (0.824) (0.332) (0.151) (0.725) 
Investment  
-2.4733** 1.0951 -0.1534 -3.7212** 2.1740 -0.0374 
(0.013) (0.419) (0.889) (0.041) (0.470) (0.983) 
Earnings volatility 
1.3302 0.1321 -2.1506 2.1079 -0.8001 -2.8370 
(0.182) (0.943) (0.124) (0.235) (0.814) (0.189) 
Return on assets 
1.3545** 0.6094 -1.6700** 2.6427** 0.0498 -2.0672* 
(0.014) (0.599) (0.028) (0.017) (0.983) (0.066) 
Leverage 
-0.6680 3.9228 -1.6293 -3.4158 7.8459 -1.5045 
(0.698) (0.137) (0.346) (0.357) (0.212) (0.639) 
/5Ȥ 145.54*** 39.23*** 16.70 77.31*** 22.04** 13.54 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.000) (0.024) (0.259) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -348.1322 -415.7813 -378.9433 -290.1209 -363.6940 -315.3671 
Partial F-statistic for first 
stage leverage regression  
4.55 
(0.0000)   
4.65 
(0.0000)  
No of observations 715 715 715 666 666 666 
 
 
